

Online Appendix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	DI (Price)	DI (Price)	DI (Price)	DI (Price)
Ethnic Match	-0.103 (0.0633)	-0.0941 (0.0864)		
High SES	0.0602 (0.0575)	0.0667 (0.0722)	0.0434 (0.0563)	0.110 (0.0739)
HighSES*Ethnic Match		-0.0160 (0.107)		
Religion Match			-0.0636 (0.0504)	0.0156 (0.0764)
HighSES*Religion Match				-0.144 (0.105)
Constant	0.343 (0.232)	0.343 (0.234)	0.257 (0.228)	0.190 (0.232)
Buyer Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2	0.123	0.124	0.111	0.134
Observations	86	86	86	86

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 1: This table presents results from the pilot housing audit, where the outcome is a seller-specific discrimination index based on the price quote provided for available housing. Because the outcome is a discrimination index, a positive sign on the coefficient is interpreted as more discrimination, meaning receiving a higher price quote for available housing.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	DI (Weight)	DI (Weight)	DI (Weight)	DI (Weight)
Ethnic Match	-0.0387 (0.0253)	0.00519 (0.0408)		
High SES	0.0165 (0.0294)	0.0431 (0.0351)	0.0222 (0.0297)	0.0320 (0.0427)
HighSES*Ethnic Match		-0.0691 (0.0507)		
Religion Match			-0.00422 (0.0250)	0.00467 (0.0373)
HighSES*Religion Match				-0.0161 (0.0499)
Constant	0.0497 (0.0421)	0.0306 (0.0442)	0.0393 (0.0465)	0.0330 (0.0508)
Buyer Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2	0.159	0.180	0.133	0.134
Observations	87	87	87	87

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2: This table presents results from the pilot rice audit, where the outcome is a seller-specific discrimination index based on the amount of rice provided in a transaction. Because the outcome is a discrimination index, a positive sign on the coefficient is interpreted as more discrimination, meaning receiving less rice.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	DI (Price)	DI (Price)	DI (Weight)	DI (Weight)
Ethnic Match	0.00467 (0.00459)	0.00490 (0.00590)	-0.00535 (0.00532)	0.00629 (0.00679)
High SES	0.00935* (0.00406)	0.00961+ (0.00579)	0.0105* (0.00472)	0.0236*** (0.00670)
HighSES*Ethnic Match		-0.000496 (0.00794)		-0.0249** (0.00915)
Constant	0.00969 (0.00880)	0.00960 (0.00893)	0.0715*** (0.0102)	0.0668*** (0.0103)
R^2	0.110	0.110	0.039	0.056
Observations	421	421	419	419

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3: This table presents results from the second audit, where all interactions that had any uncertainty about whether the confederate found the correct rice seller are removed. The findings hold. Confederates who appear higher class are charged more and receive less rice. The interaction between perceived class and ethnic match is significant in the model where the outcome is weight.




Figure 1: This figure shows the relationship between price paid for rice and amount of rice received from the full audit. As with the pilot data, receiving less rice is associated with paying a higher price.