

**A Race to the Top?:
The Aid Transparency Index and the Normative Power of Global Performance
Assessments**

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Recent studies on global performance assessments (GPAs) reveal the distinct power that can be accrued and exercised by non-state actors in world politics. How and when does this happen? Using a mixed-methods approach, we examine the impact of the Aid Transparency Index (ATI), an annual rating and rankings index produced by the UK-based NGO Publish What You Fund. The ATI seeks to shape development aid donors' behavior with respect to their evolving commitments to transparency. To investigate the ATI's effect, we construct an original panel dataset of donor transparency performance before and after ATI inclusion (2006-2013). To further probe the causal mechanisms that explain variations in donor behavior we also use extensive qualitative research, including 150 key informant interviews, between 2010-2016. Our analysis finds that the ATI does in fact influence the transparency behavior of donors when those agencies' primary mandate is development assistance. Moreover, our mixed methods evidence reveals *how* this happens. Consistent with Kelley & Simmons' central argument that GPAs exercise influence via social pressure, we find that the ATI shapes donor behavior primarily via the diffusion of professional norms, organizational learning, and peer pressure. This contrasts with conventional arguments, particularly those embedded in principal-agent frameworks, that would hypothesize the ATI's power over donor agencies to derive from the index's reduction of information asymmetries and political authorizers' oversight and control. The ATI's pathways to influence are rooted primarily in normative, rather than material, power.

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I. Introduction

One of the most striking, if surprising, examples of the power and influence exercised by global performance assessments in world politics is the case of the Aid Transparency Index (ATI) – an annual international rating and ranking of international development assistance donor agencies by Publish What You Fund (PWYF). PWYF was established in 2008 to monitor the progress of international donors in publicly disclosing where they spend their aid funds, on whom and for what. PWYF is quite small; it has less than 10 staff members and a 2016 budget of less than £700,000. Housed in a modest one-room office right above an Italian restaurant on London’s South Bank, PWYF has no direct material power with which to coerce change in the behavior of these large multilateral and bilateral donors. Instead, PWYF seeks to influence the transparency of these agencies by using its yearly ATI to strategically name and shame. In simplest terms, PWYF, like many other non-state actors lacking traditional material power, seeks to exercise influence over much more powerful actors in world politics by exploiting the politics of numbers.²

Perhaps surprisingly, the ATI’s influence appears to be felt by many of its intended targets. Each spring and early summer, major aid donors from the World Bank to the United States Agency for International Development engage in furious rush of data collection and reporting to meet the review deadlines for the ATI. Donors exhibit visible anxiety in pushing through new policies that express new or stronger commitments to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and signal compliance with emerging national laws and open data standards. They struggle to compile past and current data on detailed budgets, activities, procurement and even results data – all in fear that failure to do so will result in another year of lingering in the ATI’s shameful categories of “fair”, “poor” or “very poor.”³ A few months later, a similar flurry of activity and social media erupts as the ATI goes to press and host a major launch event in Washington, DC.

We find that the ATI does indeed have substantial impact on aid donors’ disclosure behavior. This disclosure is driven primarily by the ATI’s normative power, with practices diffusing in aid agencies’ epistemic community. At the same time, the material power of aid agencies’ principals (states) and horizontal accountability also appear to play some role in influencing donors’ behavior. Overall, we find that the ATI’s power stems both from its content and its method of engagement with target actors, with the index changing organizational understandings and interests around transparency as it influences agency behavior.

² Andreas and Greenhill 2010.

³ Interviews (2012-2016) with PWYF U.S. representative; PWYF London staff; senior staff members, United Kingdom Department for International Development; senior resident scholar, Brookings Institution; senior scholars, Center for Global Development; senior aides, U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee and U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See also Paxton 2014.

II. Background: Aid Transparency and the Rise of the ATI

One of the most significant changes in international development over the past decade has been the rise of a concerted international movement to increase the transparency of the multibillion dollar global aid industry. Since the first high level forum on aid effectiveness in Paris in 2003, there has been a proliferation of declarations, initiatives, commitments, laws and startup networks and organizations dedicated to prying open the spigot of information on donor agencies' own projects and programs. The presumed benefits of such open aid data include the centralization of information for better donor coordination, better development planning and management, and the empowerment of aid stakeholders to push for greater voice and feedback.⁴

At the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea in November 2011, most major donor countries and agencies – including many from the global south – committed themselves to reporting their aid information to a common standard that combined three complementary systems: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS++),⁵ the OECD DAC Forward Spending Survey (FSS)⁶ and the International Aid Transparency Initiative.^{7 8} Over this time period, the international regime complex for aid effectiveness, transparency and accountability has grown by leaps and bounds, constituted by a rich set of supranational initiatives,⁹ national level policies and open data systems,¹⁰ and international non-governmental organizations and networks devoted specifically to the advocacy and production of transparent and open aid data.¹¹ The ATI is part of this broader movement.

The ATI works explicitly through active and sustained engagement with data providers. Publish What You Fund makes available the evaluation criteria for a given year's index well before release, and engages in a three-month dialogue with every agency prior to the release of the index. While the method of calculating the ATI has been modified slightly over time,¹² the ATI has always focused on the publishing of specific data regarding aid

⁴ Florini 2002 and 2007; Collin, Zubairi, Nielson and Barder 2009; Publish What You Fund 2009; Mulley 2010; Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Herrling 2015; Barder 2016.

⁵ <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1>

⁶ <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FSS>

⁷ <http://www.aidtransparency.net/>

⁸ OECD 2012.

⁹ See, e.g. the EU Aid Transparency Guarantee and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

¹⁰ For example, many countries – especially lead countries such as Sweden, Britain, Denmark, and the US - adopted National Transparency Guarantees with specific references to aid (Sweden, Britain), integrated aid transparency commitments within their Open Government Partnership National Action Plans, and similar open aid data strategies and policy papers. In the U.S. case, see Obama's executive order on open government (Obama 2009) and the Office of Management and Budget's open government director (Orzag 2009). For examples of aid transparency systems, see the UK Department for International Development's DevTracker, Sweden's openaid.se, Denmark's Danida Open Aid USAID's Global Aid Explorer, and the US Government's Foreign Assistance Dashboard. See also Clare, Verhust and Young 2016; Greening 2012.

¹¹ See, e.g., AidData, Aidwatch, aidinfo, Development Gateway, DevInfo, Development Initiatives, Data2X, Interaction, Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, Open Aid Partnership, Oxfam International, and many others.

¹² Most notably in 2013; 2013-2016 indices have seen very few changes. However all empirical models employed below include year fixed effects to absorb the differences between ATI standards over the period.

flows at the activity level – at the level of particular interventions and projects. Evaluated indicators include the provision of information as to the title, description, budget, and objectives of interventions. Table 1 provides greater detail.

TABLE 1: 2016 ATI Indicators and Weights

ATI Total Score out of 100%

- 1. Commitment to Aid Transparency (10%)**
 - Quality of FOIA Legislation (3.33%)
 - Implementation Schedule (for IATI Common Standard) (3.33%)
 - Accessibility of Aid Information through donor portals, databases, etc. (3.33%)

- 2. Organizational Level Publications (25%)**
 - Planning: Strategy Documents (2.5%)
 - Planning: Annual Report (2.5%)
 - Planning: Allocation Policy by Themes or Countries (2.5%)
 - Planning: Procurement Policy (2.5%)
 - Planning: Strategy Documents – Country Level (2.5%)
 - Financial: Total Organization Budget (three year forward spending) (4.17%)
 - Financial: Disaggregated Budget (4.17%)
 - Financial: Audits (4.17%)

- 3. Activity Level Publications (65%)**
 - Basic Activity Information: Implementer (1.63%)
 - Basic Activity Information: Unique ID (1.63%)
 - Basic Activity Information: Title (1.63%)
 - Basic Activity Information: Description of Activity (1.63%)
 - Basic Activity Information: Planned Dates (1.63%)
 - Basic Activity Information: Actual Dates (1.63%)
 - Basic Activity Information: Current Status (1.63%)
 - Basic Activity Information: Contact Details (1.63%)
 - Classifications: Collaboration Types (1.86%)
 - Classifications: Flow Type (1.86%)
 - Classifications: Aid Type (1.86%)
 - Classifications: Finance Type (1.86%)
 - Classifications: Sectors (1.86%)
 - Classifications: Sub-National Location (1.86%)
 - Classifications: Tied Aid Status (1.86%)
 - Related Documents: Memorandum of Understanding (2.17%)
 - Related Documents: Evaluations (2.17%)
 - Related Documents: Objectives (2.17%)
 - Related Documents: Budget Documents – Activity Level (2.17%)
 - Related Documents: Contracts (2.17%)
 - Related Documents: Tenders (2.17%)
 - Financial: Budget – annual/quarterly; total activity commitments (3.25%)
 - Financial: Commitments (3.25%)
 - Financial: Disbursements & Expenditures (3.25%)
 - Financial: Budget ID (3.25%)
 - Performance: Results (4.33%)
 - Performance: Impact Appraisals (4.33%)
 - Performance: Conditions (4.33%)

Source: Publish What You Fund. 2016a. *2016 Aid Transparency Index*.

The comprehensive index largely evaluates national government agencies and international organizations, as well as a few foundations (e.g. Hewlett and Gates). The primary focus is bilateral aid agencies (e.g. the US Agency for International Development and UK Department for International Development) and major multilateral aid-focused organizations (e.g. the UN Development Program, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and regional development banks). Notably, the index also includes agencies that disburse foreign aid, even though development assistance is not their primary mandate. The 2016 index includes, for example, six separate US Government agencies that provide official development assistance (ODA):¹³ the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the US Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense. Appendix Table A1 provides a complete listing of all covered agencies by country and their inclusion in the various waves of the ATI.

Achieving aid transparency is not an easy task. Donor agencies have enjoyed relative opacity for most of their existence. For years, efforts to enact fundamental changes in national freedom of information acts and organizations information disclosure policies have been met with resistance and persistent delays.¹⁴ Numerous published analyses and interviews repeatedly point out pervasive problems of organizational inertia, staff’s cultural fears surrounding transparency, and a myriad of technological and economic barriers to change.¹⁵ Yet over the past ten years, this landscape has shifted dramatically.¹⁶

A number of important actors in the international aid system have taken explicit note of the ATI in driving change in transparency practices. As Helen Clark, former New Zealand Prime Minister and Administrator of the UN Development Programme, said at the launch of the 2016 ATI, “Publish What You Fund’s annual assessment is a very powerful driver for improving reporting on transparency... you [Publish What You Fund] really motivated us to work very hard... we’ve seen [the ATI] as a huge incentive to work to excel”.¹⁷ Nancy Lee, deputy CEO of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation, said “[the ATI] is a big deal for us. We care about this a lot. This is part of our culture... it’s part of our DNA.”¹⁸

Most directly, the ATI has appeared in US Congressional conversations regarding aid allocations and foreign aid legislation. When co-sponsoring the Foreign Aid

¹³ While the US has the greatest number of evaluated agencies in 2016 (and 2014, the year with the broadest coverage), it is not alone in having multiple units evaluated. E.g. in 2014, 5 UK, 3 German, and 3 French agencies were evaluated. Amongst multilaterals, 4 EC and 3 UN agencies were evaluated.

¹⁴ Nelson 2001; Florini 2007; Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; and Ingraham 2015.

¹⁵ Bent 2015.

¹⁶ For reviews of transparency and accountability initiatives in global development, including campaigns and initiatives focused on aid transparency, see Darby 2010; Martin 2010; Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; McGee and Gaventa 2013; and Weaver 2016.

¹⁷ Speech at Launch of 2016 ATI, Center for Global Development, April 13 2016. Speech online at <http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/live-2016-aid-transparency-index-launch/>; quote at approximately 3:45.

¹⁸ Speech at Launch of 2016 ATI, Center for Global Development, April 13 2016. Speech online at <http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/live-2016-aid-transparency-index-launch/>; quote at approximately 26:10.

Transparency and Accountability Act (FATA) Texas Congressman Ted Poe noted the relatively poor performance of US Agencies on the ATI as part of the motivation for the bill.¹⁹ The US Senate has also prominently referenced the index, with good performance on the ATI explicitly mentioned as one of the reasons justifying continued support of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI).²⁰

Kelley & Simmons in this volume describe Global Performance Assessments (GPAs) as “ways to attract attention to performance and stimulate discussion, comparison, and ultimately action.”²¹ Our empirical work here, based upon extensive interviews and statistical analysis, demonstrates this. We show that the ATI is now widely seen as the industry leader in assessing aid transparency, with mounting evidence of its role in setting accountability standards for donors. In fact, a recent survey of staff within U.S. development agencies revealed that over 75% of respondents thought the ATI had a “very positive impact” on their own agency’s transparency efforts.²²

The ATI poses several questions relevant to the study of GPAs and their effects upon global governance. First, do evaluated agencies in fact care about their ATI scores and respond to treatment (coverage) by this GPA, or is all the activity epiphenomenal? If agencies do care, what is it that makes these large aid bureaucracies sensitive or receptive to the ratings and rankings produced by the ATI in a way that provokes them to take serious steps towards redressing gaps in transparency policies and practices? How does PWYF, as a small NGO lacking direct financial or political influence, use its annual rating and ranking of donor transparency to accrue authority in the global governance of development and to influence the behavior of large international donors?

III. The ATI’s Power and Channels of Influence: Theory, Driving Questions and Methodology

In this paper we explore and test two sources of power and channels of influence for the ATI: material (or coercive) power, exercised by the ATI via domestic politics, and normative (social) power exercised via elite politics within and between donor organizations.

In the first instance of *material power derived and exercised via domestic political channels*, we hypothesize that the ATI affects donors’ behavior by altering the interests and behavior of donors’ principals (via legislative or executive board oversight and control). This expectation stems from principal-agent and sociological resource dependency theories, which both hypothesize that donor agencies’ response to the ATI may be connected to the legitimacy and resource needs of these organizations in their

¹⁹ *Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2015 --- HR 3766* 2015. Congressman Poe refers to “a recent Publish What You Fund study”, which is clearly the ATI. HR 2766 ultimately became law on July 15, 2016 (Public Law #114-191).

²⁰ Senate Resolution 578 of 2014.

²¹ Kelley and Simmons 2017.

²² Friends of Publish What You Fund 2016, 10.

task and authorizing environments.²³ Indeed, there are significant degrees of variation in aid donor's financial and operational autonomy from member states (in the case of multilaterals) or national parliaments and executive branches (in the case of bilaterals). The ATI serves as an essential tool for resolving the information asymmetries that hinder principal oversight and control. In providing detailed, regularized data on agencies' transparency performance, the ATI essentially serve as a policeman, or third party watchdog, on the behalf of principals who may have neither the capacity or willingness to closely monitor their agent's behavior. In closing the asymmetric information gap, the ATI allows tighter monitoring and greater control of agents. As such agencies with a greater degree of dependence on regularized appropriations (a lack of financial autonomy) and vulnerability to shifts in legislative oversight and control (a lack of political autonomy) ought exhibit particularly strong reactions to rankings that may shape their status in the eyes of key principals and may, in turn, inform future appropriation and legislative decisions.²⁴ If resource dependence and material power are the operative mechanism we ought expect more dependent agencies to exhibit greater responsiveness to the ATI.

From a principal-agent standpoint the ATI plays a role akin to a third-party watchdog, acting as an effective instrument to reduce principal's information asymmetries over donors' transparency behavior.²⁵ Via the lobbying and advocacy campaigns of PWYF and likeminded members of the epistemic community), the ATI can also create awareness and enhance preferences among principals for aid transparency. This channel of influence provides the ATI with a form of indirect material power, defined here as the exercise of financial or legislative authority to get actors to do what they would otherwise not want to do.

Increased awareness can lead to heightened donor demand for improvements in aid transparency, as well as implicit or explicit threats to sanction agencies who do not comply with emerging laws or norms around transparency initiatives. In other words, the ATI enables the materially weak PWYF and its key allies in the aid transparency movement to capture principals' "power of the purse" and executive or legislative authority over donor agencies. Consequently, if principals are indeed paying attention to the ATI and taking subsequent action based upon the ATI's information, we would expect aid agencies, particularly those with higher degrees of dependence on principals' financial contributions, to be especially sensitive to the ATI effects. In more resource constrained environments, the ATI may even trigger competition between agencies (particularly bilateral agencies co-existing within the same state) who fear that the ATI's score may influence the way political principals decide to appropriate funds between multiple agencies. This hypothesis is supported by numerous interviews at aid agencies, wherein staff and management frequently mention that the anticipation of greater oversight and control by key principals (such as Congress or the Executive Branch in the

²³ On PA models, see Hawkins et al 2006. For a discussion of these broader issues of IO resource dependencies, see Weaver 2008 and Moschella and Weaver 2014. See also Honig 2016 for a statistical examination on how resource dependencies and perceived legitimacy needs shape donors' responses to the ATI.

²⁴ Interviews with staff in the U.S. Congressional Research Service, U.S. General Accounting Office, and USAID.

²⁵ This is similar to the role played by NGOs in Thompson 2006.

United States) is a motivation for introducing changes in transparency policies at the agency level.

In the second instance, we expect the ATI, independent of aid's principals, to accrue and exercise *productive or normative power*, defined as the ability to define meaning and shape the identity, interests and behavior of actors around emerging norms or logics of "appropriateness" rather the consequences.²⁶ Like other GPAs, the ATI can use its ratings and rankings of donor agencies to define key goals and expectations for "good: behavior, as well as name and shame target actors in ways that trigger peer competition over relative status and other reputational concerns.

This channel of influence usually operates at the level of elite learning and interaction. This channel plays a central role in the literature on policy diffusion, including regarding global governance.²⁷ Reputation concerns between and within donor agencies motivate organizational elites to initiative efforts to implement transparency policies and data publishing practices that will improve their agencies' scores on the ATI's annual rankings. Similarly, we expect the ATI to provide organizational elites with evidence and normative arguments that help diffuse professional norms and socialize agencies' management and staff around transparency goals.

Normative power is enhanced by GPAs' productive power, defined in the sociological literature as the ability to define "good performance" through commensuration – the quantification, or simplification, of evaluative aspects of actor behavior that enables categorization, rating and relative peer ranking that would otherwise be too complex or incomparable.²⁸ Indices, benchmark reports, ratings and rankings not only serve as performance assessment tools but also as reputational intermediaries. They can be used by numerous entities as authoritative sources to sanction or reward target actor behavior. Likewise, targeted actors themselves (the subjects of assessments) can invoke the GPAs to draw positive attention to themselves (brag or self-promote), direct negative attention to others (distract or finger point), or signal their own good intentions and commitments. In turn, activists at the domestic, international and transnational level can use indices, ratings and rankings to generate issue awareness, mobilize shame, and diffuse new policy norms in highly politicized arenas.²⁹ Ratings and rankings in turn trigger reactivity, meaning that target actors will change their behavior (if not their underlying interests) in reaction to being evaluated, observed and measured.³⁰ This reactivity is encouraged through the mechanisms of the aforementioned commensuration, which serves to drive attention to specific goals, and self-fulfilling prophecies of behavioral conformity.³¹

²⁶ Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.

²⁷ Jorgens 2004.

²⁸ Espeland and Saunder 2007 and 2012.

²⁹ Dobbins, Simmons and Garrett 2007.

³⁰ Espeland and Saunder 2007.

³¹ Espeland and Saunder 2007. They define self-fulfilling prophecies as "processes by which reactions to social measures confirm the expectations or predictions that are embedded in measures or which increase the validity of the measure by encouraging behavior that conforms to it." (Espeland and Saunder 2007, 11). In other words, rankings encourage targeted actors to become more like what the rankings measure, which reinforces the validity of the measure." (Ibid, 15)

Elite behavior change around transparency policies and norms need not emerge solely from the loss of external peer or professional status. As Kelley & Simmons (this issue) note, identity and professional norms can drive behavior in response to assessment in a process not necessarily linked to external consequence.³² Monitoring can signal the value of a task to other actors in a professional network or organization.³³ GPAs can shift how a given concept is understood, how meaning is constructed around emerging understandings of transparency and accountability.³⁴ In this case, the ATI may help define community understandings and expectations around what constitutes acceptable policies and practices regarding transparency. Individuals may be motivated by comparisons (motivated by their sense of self as a professional) within their professional community, or by a feeling of being undeservedly poorly assessed by their community.³⁵ Circulation of elite staff between organizations can also foster inter-organizational learning and diffusion of new policies.³⁶ As our interviews have shown, aid agencies' elites can be highly sensitive to the ATI. Landing in the "very good" category grants bragging rights with large legitimacy gains that organizations appear to value independently from any direct link to financial sanctions or rewards.³⁷ Likewise, scoring poorly on the ATI may be used as an opportunity to signal a renewed commitment to redressing gaps in transparency policies, conveying to important external audiences that the organization cares about these goals and is taking steps to ensure that change is just around the corner.

The ATI's structure and annual assessment process enhances this elite channel of influence. The process of annually producing the ATI entails frequent and intense interaction between the PWYF assessor teams and the agencies themselves, as well as critical moments of very public "critical reflection and learning" around the time of the ATI's annual release. In other words, even in the absence of indirect material power exercised via donors' principals, the ATI can incite norm diffusion and commensuration, inculcating principles of "good" agency behavior that push organizations away from loose coupling (rhetorical commitments) to tight coupling (meaningful policy and operational change) around transparency.³⁸

Critically, we posit that this normative channel relies on agency leaders being able to guide the agency to greater aid transparency as defined by the ATI. In this case we should expect more *independent* agencies to respond more fully to the ATI. Professionals in more independent, or insulated, agencies may or may not be more open to normative channels. Conditional on diffusion of these norms reaching the agency, however, staff at more independent aid agencies are more likely to be able to turn a change of norms into observable organizational action.

³² Kelley and Simmons 2017.

³³ Larson and Callahan 1990.

³⁴ Merry, Davis, and Kingsbury 2015.

³⁵ Martins 2005.


³⁶ Tvedt 2006.

³⁷ See, for example, many organizations make direct references to ATI scores to show evidence of success. See Clare, Verhust and Young 2016, 4 (Sweden's SIDA); George 2012 (World Bank IDA); Greening 2-12 (UK DFID).

³⁸ Saunder and Espeland 2009.

Figure 1 below summarizes our theoretical framework.

Figure 1: Channels of ATI Influence and Sources of Organizational Change



This general theoretical framework suggests two more precise driving questions about when and how the ATI affects donor agency behavior that we use to frame our empirical analysis. *First, which aid donors are more or less likely to be affected by the ATI?* Here, we propose two mediating factors which shape agencies' response to the ATI: whether their primary mandate is to provide official development assistance and their relative degree of organizational independence from their political authorizers. In brief, we hypothesize that when aid is the "primary mandate" (versus a secondary mandate or goal) of an agency, the agency will be more sensitive to the (de)legitimizing effect of poor ATI score. In this situation, even without a clear threat of material sanctions from principals, agencies may anticipate greater principal oversight and control in the near future and respond with numerous efforts to improve their ATI scores. If the ATI is indeed exerting material influence over donors via indirect power captured from these agents' principals, we should expect to see agencies that are foremost orienting around providing aid to appear more responsive to the ATI over time and to be more likely to engage in strategic behavior to improve their relative rankings and their absolute ratings within the ATI's categories of indicators. Similarly, if the ATI is working through normative power, we should also expect agencies with primary mandates around aid to care more about how the ATI affects their reputation, as opposed to agencies with aid as a secondary mandate, wherein performance on aid transparency may be less proximate to their organization's internal and external legitimacy.

Second, we expect that agencies' degree of financial and political independence from their principals will have a discernible effect on their response to the ATI. However, in this instance, our hypotheses diverge depending on whether the ATI is exercising mostly

material or normative power over donor agencies. Specifically, if it is the material power of the ATI (exercised indirectly through principals) which is influencing donor behavior, we hypothesize that less independent agencies will appear more responsive to the ATI. However, if the ATI is exercising more normative power, we may see a different outcome. Agencies that have more relative independence may in fact show a greater propensity to be responsive to the ATI, insofar as they can use their scope for autonomous action to react more quickly and more aggressively to the ATI's professional norm diffusion and socialization effects than less independent organizations who may hold limited capacity to enact wide-sweeping operational reforms around transparency and data reporting without the consent and resources of their political authorizers. We further theorize and operationalize these hypotheses in sections 4 and 5 below.

We unpack and test these hypotheses through a mixed methods approach. This approach enables us to assess, both through statistical and qualitative means, how much of the ATI's power appears to derive from material or normative sources. This allows us to identify the scope conditions under which specific agencies included in the ATI will be more or less sensitive to the index's ratings and rankings.

In our quantitative analysis we seek to understand variation in donor performance on and response to the ATI between 2011-2016. To do so, we employ regression analysis using a panel dataset of the ATI with the unit of observation the agency-year.³⁹ In addition to each agency's overall and indicator-by-indicator score from 2011-2016 our dataset includes independent data on aid agency disclosure and transparency practices from 2006-2013 compiled by AidData at our request.⁴⁰ The AidData data allow us to model the presence of the ATI as a treatment, examining whether (and which) agencies respond to the presence of the ATI.

To further examine our underlying questions we use extensive qualitative evidence, foremost semi-structured key informant interviews on aid transparency policies and practices with nearly 400 subject matter experts in eight countries between 2010-2016.⁴¹ While these interviews did not ask directly about the influence of the ATI (to avoid leading questions), the line of questioning generally focused on the various factors pushing, enabling or constraining organizational changes around transparency policies

³⁹ There are five full waves of the ATI – 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016, with a 2015 'mid-term review' covering only EU and US agencies. The 2011 data was called a "pilot index"; there was also a 2010 assessment, but at a country level and based on perceptions surveys.



⁴⁰ AidData is a "stand-alone development research and innovation lab at the College of William and Mary" (<http://aiddata.org/our-story>). For a given country-year AidData uses the best, most complete data source available. Over the period in question (2006-2013) the primary source is agencies' official reporting to the OECD Development Assistance Committee's Creditor Reporting System, but the source is sometimes agencies' annual reports and public websites. AidData source choice represents a determination by arguably the organization most concerned with finding high quality historic aid data of what source provides the best available data for a given country-year. The source of data is never the IATI data on which the ATI most directly contracts; this does not mean that e.g. the data reported to OECD and that reported to IATI in a given year are independent, of course. This is not a concern, inasmuch as the focus here (and what the alternative scale drawn from AidData's data measures) is changes in the quality of the best data disclosed irrespective of the forum where that disclosure occurs, whether it is via the IATI or not.

⁴¹ Specifically, as part of a broader project on aid transparency between 2010-2016, Weaver personally interviewed or sent trained graduate research assistants to conduct over 400 interviews in eight countries, with a concentrated focus on members of the development community based in the US (DC and New York), Uganda, Malawi, Nepal and Honduras.

and practices in organizations. Approximately 150 of these interviews ultimately touched upon issues related to the influence of Publish What You Fund and the ATI. These interviews were conducted with the staff and management of donor organizations' headquarters and mission (recipient country) offices, national parliamentary and U.S. Congressional staff, relevant think tanks, civil society groups and international non-governmental organization, including multiple interviews at Publish What You Fund's office in London and with PWYF's staff in Washington, DC. In addition to this interview evidence, we analyzed a wide array primary and secondary materials, including donor organization press releases, policy documents, parliamentary and congressional hearings and legislation, and the research and advocacy materials of NGOs, CSOs and think tanks.

We use the quantitative and qualitative evidence iteratively throughout our analysis. The qualitative work helps to inductively inform the key hypotheses underpinning the statistical analysis, which in turn provides a deeper empirical test of the scope conditions for the ATI's effects. After presenting the quantitative results, we return to the qualitative evidence both to further interpret and probe our statistical findings and to address additional important questions about contested understandings of transparency and commensuration. We find that the qualitative and quantitative evidence are strongly complementary. Taken together they not only provide strong affirmation of the ATI's general impact in shaping driving aid transparency reforms, but also more pointed evidence of ATI's distinct influence - primarily via normative channels - that helps us to more precisely distinguish what kind of power this GPA exercises and how it influences the behavior of its targeted actors.

A visual examination of ATI scores and changes over time underscores the heterogeneity of agency response to the ATI. The wide differences in donors' behavior is demonstrated in Figure 2, which shows the variation in realized scores, and Figure 3, which compares each agency's score in its last year of ATI coverage to its score in its first year. This also appears to be true for countries that have more than one bilateral agency rated by the ATI (including the United States, which has six aid agencies in the list); there appears to be substantial within-country variation in ATI performance and change in ATI performance over time.



In either case – whether material or normative power dominates – we expect to observe differences in aid agencies’ responses depending on whether development assistance is their primary mandate. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is first and foremost dedicated to providing financial and technical assistance to developing countries and emerging market economies for the explicit purpose of promoting poverty alleviation, sustainable democracies and socioeconomic growth. Development aid is thus its primary mandate. The U.S. Department of Defense, on the other hand, is primarily a security-oriented agency, whose activities pertaining to development in the traditional sense are limited to a very small proportion of its budget and overall mandate. It nonetheless provides some official development assistance, but this is secondary overall to its other organizational objectives. To test for this, we include a dummy variable in the analysis that accounts for agencies’ mandate.

In the following section IV we delve into our quantitative analysis, establishing whether, and which, agencies seem to respond to the ATI. In section V, we explore our qualitative evidence to further probe mechanisms and to illustrate with specific examples the ATI’s distinct channels of influence over donors. In section VI, the conclusion, we summarize our key findings on the case of the ATI and its implications for this issue’s broader questions on GPAs. We also speculate on the future effects and channels of influence of the ATI as it moves from a relatively young to a more established GPA in the international development aid regime.

IV. When and Why Does the ATI Matter?

To investigate who responds to the ATI we build a panel at the agency-year of ATI scores (and thus ATI coverage), complementing this with historic data on agency transparency practices drawn from AidData’s database. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the key variables. We also include a calculation of agency independence and a dummy for whether the aid agency’s primary purpose is the giving of foreign aid (e.g. USAID) or not (e.g. the US Department of Defense). These agencies are hereafter referred to as “aid” versus “non-aid” agencies to signal their primary mandate. The calculation of agency independence we use is drawn from Gilardi’s work on Western European regulatory agencies.⁴² Gilardi develops a scale of 21 indicators, unique in its attempt to compare the independence of a variety of agencies focusing on different issue areas from a range of countries. We, in collaboration with research assistants, attempted to apply Gilardi’s scheme to all ATI covered agencies using those indicators we were able to consistently code.⁴³ Independence is coded as a time-invariant measure based on the best available data. While this opens up possible measurement error regarding changes in independence within organization over time, we expect this measurement error should be orthogonal to the primary analysis and thus add noise (reducing power)

⁴² Gilardi 2002.

⁴³ We were able to find consistent information for four of Gilardi’s 21 indicators – term of office, source of budget, whether independence is formally stated, and whether the head of the agency is of cabinet rank. While the results presented here apply this scale to multilaterals and foundations – i.e. organizations without cabinet rank by definition, and for whom the scale was not intended by Gilardi – the results are robust to restricting the sample to bilateral (that is, state) organizations.


rather than leading to spurious inferences. The measure constructed using the Gilardi method is broad, incorporating both aid and non-aid agencies.

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ATI Score	333	40.448	24.009	0	93.3
Net Change in ATI Score Over Coverage Period	77	10.15	18.772	-39.3	75.7
Agency Independence (using Gilardi scheme)	84	.435	.154	0	1
Aidagency Status Dummy	84	.536	.502	0	1

Figure 4 illustrates the broad coverage of the ATI, alleviating concerns regarding the ATI's 'sample' within the aid universe.⁴⁴ The ATI does not assess two significant non-OECD bilateral donors, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, although the index does include China (which scores at the bottom largely because China does not report to the IATI or participate in ATI annual process). While this alleviates concerns regarding ATI selection criteria and how they might lead to spurious inferences about the effect of this GPA, it also unfortunately precludes plausible matching strategies that might provide additional analytic leverage.

⁴⁴ This is the proportion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) reported to the OECD Development Assistance Committee's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) at www.stats.oecd.org represented by those agencies included in both the ATI and the CRS. This necessarily underestimates the actual aid provided by agencies included in the ATI, inasmuch as some agencies (e.g. Chinese development aid, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Hewlett Foundation, the European Investment Bank) are covered by the ATI but do not report to CRS. This calculation uses the year of reporting and net disbursements when possible; e.g. the 2011 statistic is the proportion of 2011 net disbursements accounted for by agencies covered by the 2011 ATI. The 2016 calculation is done with 2014 data due to a lack of DAC data availability, and 2015 is omitted due to its interim review status.



While by no means determinative, Table 3 below uses the ATI overall score data to examine differential performance on the ATI with and without Country and Country*Year fixed effects, allowing us to examine intra-county differences in ATI performance. The results are quite stable with and without fixed effects: as we hypothesized, agencies whose primary purpose is the giving of foreign aid perform better in the ATI ratings than those for whom foreign aid is a secondary task.⁴⁵

Table 3 suggests that for non-aid agencies greater independence has no association with higher ATI scores. For aid organizations, however, the picture is quite different. More independent aid organizations score better on the ATI than less independent aid organizations. The greater the degree of a dedicated aid agencies' independence, the greater the agency's degree of outperformance of other organizations in their country; the least independent aid agencies perform no better, or on some specifications even worse, than other agencies from their country.

⁴⁵ To examine whether the degree of focus on aid matters in a continuous sense for non-aid agencies, with those differentially focused on aid differentially affected, I calculate the percentage of total expenditures on aid for both dedicated aid and non-dedicated aid agencies in the US and UK, drawing from agency financial and annual reports. Once dedicated aid agencies are excluded there is no relationship between share of expenditure on aid and ATI scores, nor differential performance over time once aid agencies are excluded from the sample.

Table 3: Performance on the ATI: Dedicated Aid Agencies & Independence

DV: Overall ATI Score	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Aid Agency Dummy	17.74*** (4.095)	12.86** (5.111)	20.36*** (6.567)	-17.65 (12.98)	-15.31 (24.21)	-122.6** (57.47)
Independence (Gilardi)				-32.64 (20.46)	12.78 (38.63)	-164.4 (110.4)
Ind*Aid Agency				82.98*** (27.66)	93.95* (55.88)	343.2*** (126.0)
Constant	21.96*** (3.297)	30.77*** (11.45)	5.645 (19.23)	38.21*** (10.62)	25.82 (22.35)	94.96* (55.46)
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Country FEs	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Country*Year FEs	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
R^2 -Within	.255	.256	.766	.255	.256	.766
R^2 -Between	.225	.834	.862	.300	.864	.911
Observations	333	333	333	333	333	333

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Of course, differential performance on the ATI does not mean that the ATI itself has influenced aid agencies. The results could mean that aid agencies were simply more apt to disclose information regarding flows irrespective of the ATI. To examine whether the ATI does in fact influence performance, Table 4 shifts to modeling inclusion in the ATI as a treatment variable, examining whether inclusion changes within-agency transparency practices.

For the dependent variable we draw on disclosure quality measures from AidData’s historic aid flow reporting data described above. This data commences five years prior to the ATI’s first year of coverage and two years prior to the launch of PWYF. We use a subset of this data that is quite similar in thrust to the ATI’s “Activity Level” transparency component – that is, which focuses on the completeness of individual aid activity reporting. In so doing we choose a measure that is distinct, but closely related, to the focus of the ATI, begins before the ATI, and allows for use of the ATI as a treatment variable and thus organization fixed effects.

Table 4’s findings parallel those of the descriptive analysis above. The first two columns suggest that, when year fixed effects are included, the outputs of aid agencies are indeed influenced by the ATI’s existence but those of non-aid agencies are not.

Table 4: ATI as Treatment⁴⁶

DV: AidData Activity Scale Sample:	(1) All Agencies	(2) All Agencies	(3) Non-Aid Agencies	(4) Non-Aid Agencies	(5) Aid Agencies	(6) Aid Agencies
Covered by ATI (Treatment)	5.960*** (2.213)	0.429 (3.128)	-1.830 (6.458)	-7.462 (6.996)	-7.321 (6.233)	-10.86 (7.528)
Treatment*Aid Agency	4.514* (2.724)	4.695* (2.695)				
Treatment*Independence			16.85 (13.30)	17.12 (13.33)	43.22*** (14.59)	42.08*** (14.30)
Constant	88.15*** (0.676)	94.82*** (2.779)	91.56*** (0.929)	97.21*** (3.462)	85.67*** (0.929)	91.35*** (4.867)
Organization FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
R ² -Within	0.141	0.203	0.079	0.139	0.211	0.277
R ² -Between	0.008	0.013	0.015	0.002	0.012	0.001
Observations	367	367	152	152	215	215


Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4 strongly suggests that the ATI is not epiphenomenal. Organizational outputs are influenced by this GPA, particularly for dedicated aid agencies. Inclusion in the ATI improves performance. It does so markedly more for aid agencies than for non-aid agencies, however.

Models 3 through 6 of Table 4 examine the role of agency independence for agencies whose primary business is aid (e.g. USAID) and those for which it is not (e.g. the US Department of Defense). While there is no relationship between independence and response for non-aid agencies, the greater the independence of an aid agency, the greater the improvement on the AidData scale associated with coverage by the ATI, *ceteris paribus*. Indeed, for the median aid agency on the independence scale (independence=.375), there is no statistically significant effect of ATI treatment. For a firm at the 75th percentile, however (independence=.5) there is a ten point treatment effect, one statistically significant from the null. This ten point effect would raise the median aid agency (score=89) to a nearly perfect 99. The clear ceiling effect problem with these data suggests this may be an underestimate of the effect of ATI coverage. Figures 5 and 6 graphically represent the role of independence for aid and non-aid agencies respectively (Table 4, Models 4 and 6), demonstrating the importance of agency independence for aid but not non-aid agencies.

⁴⁶ Specifications 3-6 have interaction terms but no 'base' term for independence (calculated using the Gilardi scale) as independence does not vary within organizations and is thus absorbed into organization fixed effects. This is also why specifications 1-2 do not have a 'base' term for aid agency dummy.



It appears that less dependent (more independent) aid agencies are more responsive; this is suggestive of normative rather than material power as the primary channel of influence.

V. Mechanisms: Evidence from the Field

Interviews conducted for this study affirm that aid agencies are sensitive to the status and reputation concerns invoked by the ATI's relative rankings. In line with the findings of our quantitative analysis, the interview and primary document evidence shows that competition is driven more by status and institutional rivalry concerns as opposed to resource competition.

The qualitative evidence strongly suggests that the ATI exercises influence via professional norm diffusion, productive power and commensuration, and socialization and organizational learning around transparency goals within and between aid agencies. In particular, the qualitative evidence suggests that the ATI exercises considerable normative power that incites norm diffusion and organizational learning in part because of its structure and process: it is a purposively focused and highly detailed GPA, with well defined, clearly measured and objective (as opposed to subjective or perception-based) indicators. These indicators serve a vital function in reducing ambiguity around and information asymmetries around reforms within and between organizations by clearly defining transparency benchmarks and goals. The interaction each year in collating the ATI scores has a strong commensuration effect. Internal stakeholders naturally come to operationalize transparency in ways nearly identical to the ATI's scoring methodology. In other words, the ATI constructs meaning as it changes practice.

The ATI rankings induce status and reputational concerns that have two effects on organizations. The peer rankings both serve to motivate poorly performing donor organization to signal renewed commitments and refocus organizational investment on transparency reforms. At the same time, the ATI peer rankings and release of annual reports provide opportunities for well-performing organizations to send signals to their principals and other vested parties that they have made good on their transparency promises and, in some instances, achieved compliance with international commitments, national law and open data standards. According to numerous interviews, there is a fair

amount of institutional rivalry. This appears to especially resonate in countries where there are multiple aid agencies who are vying for favorable positions in the eyes of common principals.⁴⁷ This is clearest in the case of the U.S., with a palpable rivalry the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the US Agency for International Development, both of whom have mandates that solely focus on official development assistance.

The peer pressure invoked by the ATI appears, according to interviews and observations, to be playing a role in motivating key reforms in US agencies who have performed poorly in past ATI rankings, particularly at USAID and the U.S. State Department. In the first months after then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the US would become a signatory to IATI in November 2011, these agencies (especially State) argued vigorously through back channels against an aggressive timeline and benchmarks for implementation. They argued this was because of the anticipated high costs of required changes in underlying data technology systems and the need to build capacity and buy-in from staff to report to new standards and dashboards, including the newly established U.S. Foreign Assistance Dashboard. Interviews with actors within US aid agencies and US Congress reveal that much of the rationale behind this argument fell by the wayside when the Millennium Challenge Corporation quickly enacted an ambitious transparency agenda and vaulted into the top spot of the ATI in 2013. While few interview subjects would state on the record that this was an official reason for the significant shift in USAID's approach to a more aggressive IATI implementation plan shortly thereafter, several remarked that this competition had a lot to do with getting the attention of top USAID management and putting data transparency reforms "on the front burner."

This normative power story ought not imply the absence of material power channels. In some instances, the evidence suggests that the ATI's detailed information on where donors are lagging in transparency performance is used by principals (namely national parliaments) to inform specific policies within national legislation and open data standards. Several national "aid transparency guarantees", such as in the UK and Sweden, and even the 2016 US Foreign Aid Transparency Act make specific recommendations that align with the indicators and goals of the ATI. Interviews also reveal that aid agency staff do not always wait for clear threats or actual principal exercise of oversight and control. Instead, they can act *in anticipation* of possible greater oversight and control by parliaments, executive branches, and member states - exhibiting a desire to "get ahead of the game" by taking proactive steps to implement data reporting standards that would be fully compliant with IATI and aligned to the metrics in the ATI.⁴⁸ In other instances, it is most apparent that the ATI is empowering third party actors, or, in principal-agent terms, "fire alarm mechanisms." In the US, for example, there is a thriving epistemic community around aid reform that pays close attention to the ATI. The rankings and

⁴⁷ Interview with senior staff and management at MCC, USAID, U.S. State Department, DFID, UNDP, and UNICEF. The four other US aid-granting agencies include the State Department, PEPFAR, Treasury, and Department of Defense. In addition to the US, three other countries have at least two agencies assessed by the ATI, including France (MINEFI and MAEDI), Japan (JICA and MOFA), and Germany (BMZ-GIZ and BMZ-KfW). Four multilateral groups also have multiple agencies in the ATI: the United Nations (UN DP, UNICEF, UN OCHA), the World Bank (IFC and IDA) and the European Communities (EBRD, EIB, DG-NEAR, DG-DEVCO, DG ECHO and DG Enlargement. See Appendix II (online).

⁴⁸ Interviews with staff at the U.S. General Accounting Office, Congressional Research Service, and USAID. See also Marks 2012.

ratings inform their analytical reports, lobbying and activism.⁴⁹ In fact, interviews with senior congressional staff in the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee and the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicate that a great deal of their information on the transparency performance of USG aid agencies comes via this epistemic community, with frequent reference to the ATI as a primary source of evidence.

Interviews did reveal some anxiety over resources, but not in direct connection to the ATI. Consistent with our theorization of material power, this anxiety was more often voiced by less independent organizations.⁵⁰ While this anxiety played some motivational role, the interviews make clear it was of secondary importance in driving agency responsiveness to the ATI.

The ATI changes how agencies function internally. The ATI's detailed set of indicators not only reduces complex information into consumable metrics for principals and third party watchdogs; it also reduces uncertainty on the part of the organizational leaders in terms of identifying precisely what policies and practices need to change to meet basic expectations set in international commitments and national law. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, for example, attributes its success in part to this effect: "...through the Aid Transparency Index process, Publish What You Fund and other advocacy groups have made specific recommendations to MCC in the interest of moving the field of aid transparency forward, particularly regarding how to prioritize improvements to IATI data."⁵¹ The ATI, in essence, becomes the "blueprint for reform." This strong commensuration effect shows up repeatedly in interviews with organizational staff and management and internal and published organizational strategies papers and operational policies. Notably, this happens even when there continues to be some disagreement within organizations on the importance or fit of those ideals and standards within the overall transparency agenda and core values of the organization.⁵²

Consider for a moment a key shift in USAID's transparency agenda. In July 2015, after struggling in prior years in the ATI rankings, USAID published a strategy paper on open data, depicted as the agency's "roadmap" to transparency.⁵³ The strategy paper (which was already under implementation at the time of its publication), also known as the IATI Implementation Cost-Management Plan (CMP – Phase 2), explicitly states that one of the four central goals of the strategy was to increase USAID's ATI score.⁵⁴ A month later, Alex Their, then Assistant to the USAID Administrator for the Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning, stated "...after we implemented Phase One of the CMP, our

⁴⁹ For example, key groups based in Washington, DC include the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, Center for Global Development, the Brookings Institution, the Lugar Center, Open Data Watch, Development Gateway, and Oxfam International.

⁵⁰ While interviews did not specifically ask about independence, it is clear from the interviews that actors within less independent organizations more frequently referred to external constraints on transparency reform initiatives – namely, the absence of clear directives from legislatures or conflicting marching orders, uncertainty about future resources and the "prioritization" of transparency policies amidst competing objectives in a resource-constrained organizational environment.

⁵¹ Hansen and Marschner 2015. For similar statements by the Canadian International Aid Agency, see Bhusan and Bond 2013.

⁵² Interviews with staff and management at USAID and World Bank. See also Koeberle 2016

⁵³ Hamilton 2015; see also Thier and Crumbly 2015

⁵⁴ USAID 2015

Publish What You Fund Aid Transparency Index....increased more than 20 points and moved USAID from ‘Fair’ to ‘Good’. This was an exciting, tangible way to demonstrate our progress, and this success raised awareness around the Agency on these important efforts.”⁵⁵

Pointedly, the CMP provides unambiguous evidence that USAID is now measuring progress in policy change – and aligning goals – directly around the ATI (see Table 5). The snapshot below of the IATI Cost Management plan shows how the evaluation metrics for the CMP include outcomes explicitly stated in terms of anticipated scores on all of the ATI indicators.

Table 5: Snapshot of the 2015 USAID IATI Cost Management Plan

Indicator Name	Field Contents	Points to Gain in PWYF’s ATI
Allocation Policy	Web links to Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ)	1.25
Annual Report	Web links to Agency Performance Report and Agency Annual Letter	1.25
Audit	Web link to Agency Financial Report	2.09
Country Strategy	Web links to Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS)	2.50
Disaggregated Budget by Recipient Country, Future year 1	Due to two errors in the XML output, USAID is not receiving full credit for the information currently reported. Once corrected, USAID expects to receive 1/3 of the total possible points due to only having one of three years of forward-looking budget data.	1.5
Organization Strategy	Web links to Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the FY 2014-2017 USAID and Department of State Strategic Plan, Agency Performance Plan, and Agency Priority Goals	1.25
Procurement	Web link to USAID’s Automated Directive System (ADS) and Agency Acquisition and Assistance (A&A) Planning Functional Series, Chapter 300	1.25
Total Organization Budget, Future year 1	Due to an error in the XML output, USAID is not receiving full credit for the information currently reported. Once corrected, USAID expects to receive 1/3 of the total possible points due to only having one of three years of forward looking data	1.5

Source: United States Agency for International Development. 2015a.

⁵⁵ Quoted in Hamilton 2015

In sum, the process of constructing the annual ATI itself has three apparent effects that stem from its normative and productive power. First, the inclusive nature of the ATI review process, which includes opportunities for target organizations to participate in the collection of data and validation of results, lends considerable legitimacy, credibility, and authority to Publish What You Fund and the ATI itself. Because donors are directly involved in the construction of the index and have opportunities to contest the data before the index is finalized, the results are rarely openly contested. Second, interviews with the staff of PWYF and aid agencies across the board reveal that the process of collating the ATI results every year (a process that takes several months and repeated interaction between PWYF staff and the targeted donor groups) - provides opportunities for *organizational learning* and the *diffusion of transparency policy norms*. During the busiest months of the review process, organizations are more or less compelled to reflect on their progress towards transparency and regroup on their strategies for reform, especially since the ATI gives some points for organizational commitments and implementation plans even in the absence of actual policy changes in reporting.⁵⁶ The costs of inattention to this process is a bad score – or even a stagnant score - with a lingering sense of “what have you done lately.”

According to numerous interviews and second source documents, the ATI’s indicators and metrics also enable reform champions (within and outside the organizations) not only to use the ATI to inform specific strategies, but also to mobilize support, organizational learning and norm internalization around new transparency rules. References to the results of ATI rankings and ratings help “reform champions” to persuade reticent staff of the merits of changes to operational policy, mitigate fears of transparency risks, and (as discussed above) invoke feelings of peer competition to mobilize support for new operational policies.

The comparative rankings and ratings embedded in the ATI also facilitate inter-organizational learning by enabling agencies to learn from the experiences of peer institutions in building an organizational culture around transparency reforms, overcoming technological barriers, and building staff capacity in needed areas – an effect quite synergistic, but distinct, from that of peer naming and shaming. In the words of Brookings scholar George Ingraham, such inter-and intra-organizational learning spurred from discussions surrounding the ATI helps organizations learn to “stop hugging data.”⁵⁷ There is still room for bragging even in these accounts: organizations are often quick to claim that their own success in implementing transparency, as evidence in ATI rankings, has served to demonstrate to other organizations that implementing seeming “costly” or “risky” transparency reforms are, contrary to expectations, neither costly nor risky.⁵⁸

Overall, the qualitative evidence supports our quantitative findings by revealing that both normative and material channels are present in the ATI’s exercise of influence and donors’ behavioral changes around transparency. The interview evidence likewise

⁵⁶ Clare, Verhust and Young 2016, 9; Hansen and Marschner 2015; UK DFID 2015

⁵⁷ Interview with George Ingraham, Brookings Institution.

⁵⁸ See also Clare, Verhust and Young 2016, 10; see also Hansen and Marchner 2015.

suggests that the normative channels and the exercise of productive power are especially consequential.

Quantitative findings support the presence of both material and normative channels. Table 6 examines whether evaluated agencies respond to two kinds of competitive pressure. First, does the changing relative status of other agencies, as measured by a shift in rank (e.g. the gap between 10th and 20th) or category (e.g. the gap between “good” and “fair”) in the previous year lead to a change in organizations’ ATI scores? Second, do organizations respond to a change in their own score in a given year by altering performance in the subsequent year? Normative and material pressure could operate in both cases; the existence of a better-performing agency might motivate staff (normative), or raise concerns that a larger gap will lead to negative attention from political authorizers (material).

Table 6: Responses to Competition/Changes in Performance by Agencies

DV: Overall ATI Score	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sample:	All Aid Agencies	All Aid Agencies	All Aid Agencies	When Change<0	When Change>0
L.Gap to In-country Cat Max	17.14* (9.511)				
L.Category Gap*Independence	-56.10** (27.74)				
L.Gap to In-country Rank Max		-0.421 (0.535)			
L.Ordinal Gap*Independence		1.334 (1.346)			
L.Rank change from previous year			0.216*** (0.0619)	0.00199 (0.208)	-0.435 (0.459)
Rank change*Independence			1.341*** (0.266)	2.072** (0.466)	3.441* (1.559)
Constant	63.32*** (3.327)	62.85*** (3.291)	57.42*** (2.135)	42.58*** (2.563)	64.23*** (4.279)
Organization FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R ² -Within	.346	.326	.808	.940	.843
R ² -Between	.001	.117	.035	.017	.004
Observations	120	120	69	32	34

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6 suggests it is the least independent aid agencies that are most responsive to a greater category gap.⁵⁹ If another agency from the same country improves their performance by one category – e.g. moving from “Good” to “Very Good” while the agency in question remains in the “Fair” category – an agency at the bottom of the observed distribution of aid agency independence would see an improvement of 17 points, ceteris paribus, or nearly an entire category band (which is 20 points, with categories defined by quintiles). This provides quantitative support for the peer competition findings from interviews. That the most resource dependent agencies are most responsive to greater perceived difference between themselves and their peers suggests the important (if indirect) role of material power in this effect.

⁵⁹ While the category names have changed over the years, there have always been 5 categories. In the 2016 ATI the 5 categories are “Very Good”, “Good”, “Fair”, “Poor”, and “Very Poor”.

Responses by agencies to absolute changes in their ratings and rank, however, suggest normative channels are present as well.⁶⁰ While all agencies show a greater likelihood for scores to improve in year 2 if rank improved in year 1, and for scores to decline in year 2 if rank declined in year 1, more independent agencies are much more affected by change of rank. That it is more, rather than less, independent agencies who are more responsive to these changes suggests that normative channels are more influential.

Table 6, then, adds to the quantitative picture provided by Tables 3 and 4. While the ATI may primarily act via normative power, Table 6 provides suggestive evidence for the presence of material channels of influence as well.

Conclusion: The Evolving Effects of the ATI

ATI scores do not have significant direct links to consequences for agencies. The ATI is put out by an organization that initially was without substantial status or material power in the aid community. As such, the ATI's effect on evaluated organizations is an instantiation claim that GPAs without status or reputation will sometimes have an effect on target actors. The channels via which the ATI seems to be operating casts doubt on whether said GPAs will even need to 'borrow' carrots and sticks from other powerful actors to be effective. Comparable, public measures, developed through high interactive processes between the assessors and the assessed, can produce strong commensuration and norm diffusion effects even in the absence of extrinsic, material pressures.

What are the systemic results that we observe and what can we conclude about the distinct effects of the ATI on donors' transparency behavior? Between 2010 and 2016, the number of organizations in the "good" or "very good" ATI category has doubled. This is likely due to the aforementioned proliferation of national and organizational initiatives around open data policies – in part enabling or reflecting the successful activism of PWYF and the effects of the ATI. Gains may also be a result of pressure for greater transparency and accountability from aid receiving countries, where more than 70 aid information management systems have been established. According to Owen Barder, one of the founders of IATI and the aid transparency movement, aid transparency may now be well past the tipping point in its norm life cycle:

“With more than half of all official development finance now visible in IATI, there is no longer any doubt that real-time transparency of aid information is both technically feasible and cost-effective. Five years ago this was contested. One large donor agency opposed aid transparency claiming that it would cost them about \$800m to implement [...] Today that agency is in the “good” category of the Aid Transparency Index. Donors, NGOs and private contractors who do not publish comprehensive, real time aid data are fast running out of excuses.”⁶¹

⁶⁰ The analysis of rank change in Table 4 excludes 2015, an 'interim' release covering only the US and the EU. The reports issued in 2015 did not formally rank participants, and in any case all covered entities would have known that this was an unusually small sample and thus been less attentive to rank.

⁶¹ Barder 2016.

The ATI is by no means solely responsible for the dramatic changes we have seen in international aid transparency over the past ten years. Indeed, an objective examination of the organizational literature reveals that some major donors – for example China – appear to make no mention of the ATI, IATI or broader transparency commitments. Nonetheless, there is both quantitative and qualitative evidence that the ATI has played a significant role in building awareness and informing specific transparency reform policies. We see this most clearly through the interview data, which highlights primarily normative, but also material, channels of influence: peer rankings that induced competition and a race to the top; commensuration effects that reduced information asymmetries, empower oversight and control, and reduced organizational uncertainty; and the process of productive knowledge generation that generates legitimacy, supported organizational learning and cultural reform, and helps to diffuse new policy norms within and between target organizations. As Sarah Lucas from the Hewlett Foundation argues, “The fact that the race is on—for increased transparency in foreign assistance—is a huge tribute to Publish What You Fund’s Aid Transparency Index (ATI).”⁶²

This finding does not come without key caveats. There is good evidence that dedicated aid agencies have changed their disclosure behaviors substantially in response to the ATI, while non-dedicated aid agencies have done so only to a very modest degree. While material channels play a role, normative power seems the dominant channel of this GPA’s influence that explains this variation. The ATI has proven that it can affect the actions and motivations of aid elites in organizations where aid is the primary mandate. In so doing, the ATI case demonstrates that a GPA can strategically use normative channels to substantially alter behavior it considers important within a relatively tightly knit professional community. However, such a strategy may not be likely to extend to influencing non-aid organizations, suggesting ATI’s expenditure of effort in evaluating e.g. the US Department of Defense may be of limited usefulness in terms of exacting change in the DoD’s transparency policies and practices. Nonetheless, the ATI’s existence and success in influencing disclosure suggests that integrating comparability in disclosure (i.e., placing emphasis on relative rankings), and facilitating comparisons via a GPA, may be quite effective in other efforts to change behavior of IOs in transparency and other issue-areas.

The ATI is critically shaping what transparency means for aid organizations. However, not everyone is comfortable with this outcome. The most prominent concern voiced by informants, and picked up in several secondary resources, regarding the ATI is the ATI’s purposive focus on donor convergence to the IATI common standard. In fact, only data published to the IATI standard can score up to 100% on each indicator in the ATI – a feature that itself induces reactivity, or conformity, around a particular form of commensuration.⁶³ When asked if the ATI presented any concerns or risks, interviewees were quick to point out that the pressures induced by the ATI to signal commitments to and compliance with the IATI common reporting standards meant that organizations often had to adopt data collection and reporting systems that did not always represent the

⁶² Lucas 2014.

⁶³ Gutman and Horton 2015, 9.

quickest or most efficient route to full transparency. It is thus interesting that commensuration, or conformity around the ATI's norms of transparency, have taken hold despite conflicting ideas and sentiments about their appropriateness. At the same time, this qualitative finding may portend a varying effect of normative power over time as the ATI ages. This contestation over the operationalization of 'transparency' may lead in future to some discrediting or distancing from the ATI, pressures for adapting the index to be more inclusive of other indicators and weights, or perhaps even the rise of new GPA competitors that reflect changing norms regarding the structure and goals of aid transparency.⁶⁴

A more existential question revolves around the ATI's core norms, with respect to defining what the end goal of aid transparency looks like and, more critically, the focus on monitoring the supply, as opposed to actual use, of aid data – and by whom. The lack of demonstrable evidence that vested stakeholders are actually using the data produced through transparency initiatives detracts from the case for transparency at a key time when reaching the movement's goal demands renewed investments in open data standards.⁶⁵ PWYF's CEO noted this in a recent blog post, saying "The impact of our work has been less than we hoped, however, because of limited use of our data. Much of our early work assumed that techies would build tools to visualize aid data, and developing country citizens would find ways to use these tools. The experience of the past five years suggests that isn't enough."⁶⁶ It is thus an open question whether the ATI can have substantive impact on the planning, execution, and assessment of development projects either by the agencies that fund them or in the countries where the coalface of project implementation takes place. At the same time the ATI alters what transparency means in practice even as it encourages greater disclosure; the ATI is more than a mere assessor of transparency practices, it is an active constructor of what it in fact means to be "transparent". Further research might investigate whether and when the ATI or other GPA-induced information disclosures are actually having downstream impacts; when the information disclosed is itself an input for decision making or civil society advocacy.

In conclusion, the ATI clearly affects (some) measured agencies, and as such is an important part of how power is being wielded by outside (and traditionally weak) actors to affect the behavior of government agencies and international organizations involved in the distribution of foreign aid. This behavior change appears to be stimulated primarily by normative power through aid's epistemic community than by the material power of agency funders and political principals. The ATI instantiates that NGO "Davids" can

⁶⁴ At the fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea in November 2011, the Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation⁶⁴ was created and mandated to monitor donor progress towards the Busan agreement, including commitments to transparency. The first Global Monitoring Report 2014⁶⁴ was released just prior to the 2015 Fifth High Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Mexico. The monitoring framework thus far appears to depend upon voluntary reporting by participating countries and organizations and a vague methodology and set of indicators; as such, it does not appear to be emerging yet as a viable competitor to the ATI. However, the clear overlap in the indices' purposive goals may indicate some movement in the competitive landscape, with yet unknown consequences for its power and influence of the ATI.

⁶⁵ Fung et al 2008; Gaventa and McGee 2013; McGee 2013; Davies, Fernando and Alonso 2013; Carter 2014; Rank and Steele 2014; Davies 2014; USAID 2015b; Simons 2016; Weaver 2016.

⁶⁶ Simons 2016.

sometimes substantially influence the behavior of state actor “Goliaths”, with GPAs a potentially important stone in the slingshot.

Online Appendix I: Interviews (not included in word count)

Note: Interviewee's titles and institutional affiliations listed below reflect positions held at the time of the interviews. Overall, between 2010-2016, approximately 400 interviews were conducted. However, interview subjects who requested full anonymity are not indicated in this list.

Malawi [March 2011, July 2011 and January-February 2013. Interviews conducted in collaboration with Josh Powell, Christian Peratsakeris, Abigail Ofstedahl, Sarah McDuff, Sam Barrett, and Justin Baker]

Twaib Ali, Assistant Director, Debt & Aid Coordination Unit, Ministry of Finance
David Anderson, Impact Evaluation and Monitoring, Kickstart UNDP/ATMS Project, Nairobi, Kenya
Mr. Archanjel, US Agency for International Development
James Banda, Deputy Director, Land Management & Training, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Land Resources Conservation
Susan Banda, Environmental & Social Assessment Specialist, Millennium Challenge Account- Malawi
Agnes Lumphezi Banda, Humanitarian Response Officer, Danish Church Aid
Aaron Batten, Overseas Development Institute Economist, Malawi Ministry of Finance, Overseas Development Institute Economist
Uta Borges, Country Director, GTZ
Patrick Brenny, Country Coordinator, Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
Kennedy Brown, Chairman Mpasovillage, Climate Change Adaptation in Africa (IDRC/DFID Project)
Steven Brown, Secretary Mpasovillage, Climate Change Adaptation in Africa (IDRC/DFID Project)
William Chadza, Secretariat of CISONEEC & Director of Center for Environmental Policy and Advocacy (CEPA)
Costly Chanza, Director of the Department of Town Planning and Estate Services, Blantyre City Assembly
Alinafe Chibwana, Young professional (intern), National Climate Change Programme, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD)
Journey Chikumba, Member Chilobwe Village
Chancy Chilimbila, Title unknown, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD)
Augustin Chilkuni, Programme Officer. Royal Norwegian Embassy
Mbosta Chilembwe, Agriculture Extension Officer, TA Maseya, Climate Change Adaptation in Africa (IDRC/DFID Project)
Helmes Chimombo, Chairmen Chilobwe Village
George Chimseu, MVAC Technical Advisor, Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC), Ministry of Development, Planning and Cooperation
Vitumbiko Chinoko, Programme Officer, Christian Aid
Ms. Chipembere, UNAIDS
Lovely Chizimba, Vulnerability Advisor, IrishAid

Yammie Dakalira, Young professional (intern), National Climate Change Programme, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD)

Martin Dawson, Deputy Head of Office, UK Department for International Development

Rex Falasi, Soche Forest Reserve Guard

Monica Fisher, Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute

Adrian Fitzgerald, Head of Development, IrishAid

Ilaria Gallo, Programme Analyst for Climate Change, Environment, Energy and Climate Change Cluster, UNDP

Peter Jimusole, Director of Planning, District of Lilongwe

Demetrio Kachingwe, Senior Budget Control Assistant, United Nation's Children's Fund

Ms. Kadewere, UNAIDS

Sam Kakhobwe, Coordinator and Point of Contact, Millennium Challenge Account-Malawi

Miriam Kalanda-Joshua, Researcher, Chancellor's College, Project for Climate Change Adaptation in Africa (IDRC/DFID)

James Kalikwembe, Evangelical Association of Malawi

Glory Kalagho, Forestry Extension Officer, Traditional Authority Kapeni

Khumbo Kamanga, Programme Officer, Coordination Unit for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (CURE)

Leonard Kamanga, Chikwawa District Forestry Officer, Project for Improved Forest Management for Sustainable Livelihoods (EU)

Gertrude Kambauwa, Chief Land Management Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Land Resources Conservation

Vera Kamtumkule, Title unknown, IrishAid

Chrissie Kamwendo, Senior Operations Officer, World Bank

Godfrey Kapalamula, Senior Program Office, Japanese International Cooperation Agency

Prince Kapondamgaga, Officer in Farmers Union Malawi

Titus Kavalo, United Nations Development Program

Walusungu Kayira, Chief Economist, Ministry of Local Government

Niall Keleher, Country Director, Innovations for Poverty Action

Mr. Nathan Khuthe, Flemish International Cooperation Agency (FICA)

Stern Kita, Department of Disaster Management Affairs

Magdalena Kouneva, UNDP Aid Effectiveness Advisor, Ministry of Finance

Wells F. Kumwenda, Project Manager, Improving Food Security and Nutrition Policies and Program Outreach, United Nations Food & Agricultural Organization and Flemish International Cooperation Agency

Karolyn Kuo, Democracy and Governance Officer, USAID – Malawi

Eric Leventhal, Program Manager, Health Financing, Clinton Health Access Initiative

Noel Loimbani, Mulanje District Agricultural Development Officer (DADO)

Madalitso Lowole, Programme Budget Officer, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Esther Lozo, Executive Assistant, World Bank

Melton Luhanga, Chair of CISONICC & Director of Churches Action in Relief and Development (CARD)

Charles Machinjili, Commissioner of Statistics, National Statistics Office of Malawi

Myra Magareta, Treasurer Somba Village

Chrispin Magombo, Program Director for Food Security/Economic Development, Director of Food Security, Regional Program Coordinator, CARE

Peter Magombo, Environmental District Officer- Chikwawa, Project for Climate Adaptation for Rural Livelihoods and Agriculture (CARLA)- GEF NAPA Project

Rafael Makadini, Treasurer Mpasu Village, Climate Change Adaptation in Africa (IDRC/DFID Project)

Paul Makwinja, Operations Manager, United Nations Population Fund

Michael Malewezi, Program Officer, Assistant Resident Representative, Japanese International Cooperation Agency

N. S. Maluwa, Chikwawa District Agricultural Development Officer (DADO)

Matthew Manda, Deputy Director, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Land Resources Conservation

Ken Matekenya, Program Officer, ActionAid

Ernest Misomali, Assistant Resident Representative for Capacity Development, United Nations Development Program

Michael Mkoko, ICT Division, Ministry of Finance

Etta Rachel M'mangisa, Programme Analyst for Climate Change, Environment, Energy and Climate Change Cluster, UNDP

Francis Mpembeka, Agricultural Crops Officer, Agriculture Development Department-Mulanje (Climate Change Adaptation in Africa (IDRC/DFID Project)

Chisimphika Mphande, Communications Officer, CEPA

Tapona E. Msowoya, Programme Analyst, Disaster Risk Reduction and Poverty Environment Initiative, United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

Sampson Msungama, United Nations Development Program (with four staff members)

Emira Msungeni, Chiwalo Village Head

Richard Munang, Policy Strategist- Climate Change Adaptation & Development at UNEP, Project for Climate Change Adaptation and Development Initiative (CC-DARE)

Mr. Lawrence Munthali, Monitoring & Evaluation Advisor, IrishAid

Richard Museka, Zonal Manager, Total LandCare (in Nkhotakota, Malawi)

Fyaopi Mwafungu, Department of Disaster Management Affairs

Stephen Raphael Mwale, Governance Program Management Specialist, USAID – Malawi

John Mussa, Director of Land Resources Conservation, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Land Resources Conservation

Shamiso Nandi Najira, Principal Environmental Officer, Environmental Affairs Department (EAD), Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Environment

David Nangoma, Programme Officer: Biodiversity Research and Monitoring, Mulanje Mountain Conservation Trust

Mary Ng'ambi, Development Outreach and Communications Specialist, Project Management Specialist, USAID – Malawi

Delight Ngwira, African Development Bank

John L.Nkhokwe, Department Chief Meteorologist, The Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services

Alick Nkhoma, Assistant Representative, United Nations Food & Agricultural Organization

Tamani Nkhono Mvula, National Coordinator for Civil Society Agriculture Network

Lamulo Nsanja, Country Economist, KfW

Agnes L. Nyirenda, Humanitarian Officer, Danish Church Aid

Sothini Nyirenda, Programme Analyst, Climate Change, United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

Jacob Nyirongo, Norwegian Church Aid

Maynard Nyirenda, Director of Sustainable Rural Growth and Development Initiative (SRGDI)

Mr. Oghale Oddo, US Agency for International Development

Mr. Kenji Ohara, JOCV Coordinator, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Vincent O'Neil, Head of Development Coordination, Irish Aid

Enrica Pellacani, Head of Rural Development and Food Security, European Commission

Patrick Pollard, Overseas Development Institute Fellow, Ministry of Health

Karen Price, Senior Projects Officer, Malawi Environmental Endowment Trust

Koorosh Raffli, Chief of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Jan Rijpma, Assistant Resident Representation, Environment, Energy & Climate Change, United Nations Development Program –

Haig Sawasawa, GIS Specialist, Total Land Care

Lauren Shear, Program Manager, Global Health Fund, Clinton Health Access Initiative

Marita Sorheim-Rensvik, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

Howard Standen, Climate Change Advisor, UK Department for International Development

Alexander Stevens, Department for International Development

Jane Swira, Programme Manager, National Climate Change Programme, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD)

Chimvano Thawani, Debt & Aid Coordination Unit, Ministry of Finance

Kampala, Uganda

(16-23 March 2015, interviews conducted in collaboration with Kelly Steffen, Steven Damiano, Tanlyn Roelofs, and Jacqueline Homann)

Richard Okello, Aid Coordinator & GIS Specialization, USAID Uganda

Phillip Greene, Mission Economist, USAID Uganda

Asger Hallberg Borg, Country Officer, World Bank

Franklin Mutahakana, AMP Focal Point, World Bank

Sybille Schmidt, Operations Advisor, Delegation of the European Union

Theo Hoorntje, First Counsellor- Head of Cooperation, Delegation of the European Union

Cate Jaijuma, Senior Program Advisor, DANIDA
Charlotte Rosen, Financial Manager, DANIDA
Pontian Muhwezi, Country Program Officer, IFAD
Ann Turinayo, Knowledge Management & Communications Consultant, IFAD
Josephat Byaruhanga, Senior Policy Officer, Agriculture & Agribusiness, MINBUZA
Peter Michael Oumo, Economic Adviser, Irish Aid
Virginie Leroy, Agency of French Development
Mr. Weber, Head of Development Cooperation, German Embassy
Birgitta Grosskinsky, Desk Officer for Development, German Embassy
Yasumichi Araki, Senior Representative, JICA
Agnes Ndamata, UNDP
Christine Mugoyo, UNDP
Ronald Kansere Bwanika, UNDP
Alexis Rwabizambuga, Chief Country Economist, African Development Bank
Cary McCormick, UNICEF
Diego Angemi, UNICEF
Nakayima Esther, Uganda National NGO Forum
Peter Wandera, Transparency International Uganda
George Bogere, Research Fellow, ACODE
Winnie Nabiddo, Research Fellow, ACODE
Alex Talwangire, Research Fellow, ACODE
Harry Kiragga, Research Officer, ACODE
Daphne Kobugabe, Research Intern, ACODE
Bernard Sabiti, Development, Research & Training
Sophie Nampewo, Analyst, Development Initiatives
Ellen Hoxha, Chief of Party, Strengthening Decentralization for Sustainability (SDS)
Juliet Akello, Program Officer, Governance & Rights, Uganda Debt Network
Gilbert Musinguzi, Quality Assurance Manager, Uganda Debt Network

Kampala, Uganda (28 meetings, 12-25 June 2013; interviews conducted by Catherine Weaver and Justin Baker, names omitted due to IRB protocol)

Action Coalition on Climate Change (ACCC)
ACODE (Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment)
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands - Uganda
LDC Environment Centre
Makarere University
Mountbattern IT & Websites
CDM Regional Collaboration Centre
Climate Action Network - Uganda
Uganda Carbon Bureau
Water Governance Institute
Prop-Biodiversity Conservationists in Uganda (Probicou)
Royal Danish Embassy / DANIDA
Twesigye, Namanya and Co, Advocates

Uganda Climate Change Unit, Ministry of Water and Environment
Ugandan Ministry of Finance
United Nations Development Programme - Uganda
United States Agency for International Development – Uganda Mission
World Bank – Uganda Mission

Nairobi, Kenya (December 2009, names omitted due to IRB protocol)

Washington, DC*

(Meetings conducted February 2011; June 2013; September 2014 February 2015, October 2015, January-February 2016)

Augusta Abrahamse, US Global Development Lab, U.S. Agency for International Development

Gregory Adams, Director, Aid Effectiveness, Oxfam America

Carolyn Anstey, Managing Director, World Bank

Joan Atherton, Senior Policy Advisor for Aid Effectiveness, USAID/Policy, Planning and Learning Bureau, Office of Donor Engagement

Shaida Badiee, Open Data Watch

Owen Barder, Center for Global Development / AidInfo

David Beckman, President, Bread for the World

Brian Bingham, AAAS Fellow, USAID, HESN Program

Danila Boneva, UNDP and IATI

Jeremiah Carew, Deputy Director, Strategic and Program Planning Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning, U.S. Agency for International Development

Tom Carothers, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment

Jeff Chelsky, World Bank

Nancy Choi, Senior Director of Operations, Development Gateway and co-Executive Director, AidData

Samantha Custer, Director of Policy and Communications, AidData

Steve Davenport, Director of Citizen Engagement, World Bank

Taryn Davis, Development Gateway

Porter Delaney, Kyle House Group

Chad Dobson, Bank Information Center

Elizabeth Dodds, World Bank Institute Open Aid Partnership

Eduardo Estrada, Program Officer, Open Budgets Partnership, World Bank

Elizabeth Fox, Director, Global Health Bureau, USAID

Jeffrey Gutman, former Vice President, Operational Policy and Country Services, World Bank

Sarah Hennessey, Feedback Labs

Dustin Homer, Development Gateway

George Ingram, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Stephen Jarrett, US Global Development Lab, U.S. Agency for International Development

Bruce Jenkins, Bank Information Center
Tariq Khokar, Open Data Evangelist, World Bank
Johannes Kiess, World Bank Institute Open Aid Partnership
Marion Lawson, Specialist in Foreign Assistance Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service
Ben Leo, Senior Fellow & Director of Rethinking U.S. Development Policy, Center for Global Development
Catherine Marschner, Data Program Manager, Millennium Challenge Corporation
Massimo Mastruzzi, Senior Economist and Director, Open Budgets Partnership, World Bank
Daniel McGlinchy (Barney Frank's office)
Tom Melito, United States General Accounting Office
Alexander Moseson, AAAS Fellow, USAID, HESN Program
Luke Murry, Staff Director, Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Trade Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Pernilla Näsfors, Development Data Specialist, Open Aid Partnership, Innovations Lab, World Bank Institute
Sally Paxton, U.S. Representative, Publish What You Fund
Chrisian Peratsakis, Program Manager, Socrata
Josh Powell, Director of Innovation, Development Gateway
Vijaya Ramachandran, Center for Global Development
Lori Groves Rowley, Director, Global Food Security & Aid Effectiveness Program, Lugar Center
Nilmini Gunaratne Rubin, Senior Advisor, U.S. House of Representatives
Jean-Louis Sarbib, CEO, Development Gateway
David Saldivar, Oxfam America
Merrick Shaefer, US Global Development Lab, U.S. Agency for International Development
Kim Smith, USAID/Policy, Planning and Learning Bureau, Office of Donor Engagement
Michelle Strucke, Policy & Advocacy Advisor, Aid Effectiveness, Oxfam America
Didier Trinh, Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network
Katherine (Kat) Townshend, Senior Assistant for Engagement, USAID/Policy, Planning and Learning Bureau
Aleem Walji, Director, World Bank Innovations, World Bank
David Wheeler, Center for Global Development
Martin Weiss, Congressional Research Service
Dennis Whittle, Feedback Labs
Qiyang Xu, World Bank Institute Open Aid Partnership, World Bank
Tom Zearley, AAAS Fellow, USAID

London, UK

Mark Brough, Aid Information Officer, Publish What You Fund
Catalina Reyes, Advocacy Officer, Publish What You Fund
David Hall-Matthews, Executive Director, Publish What You Fund

John Adams, UK Department for International Development
Joe Powell, UK Department of Treasury
Simon Parrish, Senior Advisor, Transparency & Open Data, Development Initiatives
Ngairé Woods, Oxford University

Kathmandu, Nepal

(Meetings conducted on 8-17 December 2014; 16-20 March 2015. December interview conducted in collaboration with Brian O'Donnell, Shelby Carvalho, and Zehra Akbar. March 2015 interviews conducted by Krista Rasmussen, Robbie Paras, Nadia Sabat-Pererya, and Erin Cusack)

Shreejana Rajbhandari, AMP Focal Point, Asian Development Bank
Arun S. Rana, Program Officer, Social Protection, Asian Development Bank
Kenichi Yokoyama, Country Director, Asian Development Bank
Indra Sharan, GIS Specialist, USAID/Nepal
Kishore K.C., AMP Focal Person, USAID/Nepal
Andrew Nelson, Economist, Program & Project Development Office, USAID/Nepal
Kristin Ray, Deputy Program Director, USAID/Nepal
Bigyan Pradhan, Senior Operations Officer, World Bank
Aayushma K.C., AMP Focal Person and Operations Officer, World Bank
Surya Rana, AMP Focal Person and Program Staff, UK DFID
Kavindra Subba, AMP Focal Person, UK DFID
Andy Murray, Statistics Advisor & Results Lead, UK DFID
Nita Pacchai, Program Officer, UK DFID
Pramila Shrestha, Finance & Control Officer, Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation (SDC)
Aman Johnche, Program Management Specialist & Team Leader, Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation (SDC)
Milan Shrestha, Finance and Administration Officer, International Labor Organization
Nita Neupane, Program Officer, International Labor Organization
Govinda Poudyal, Program Finance Assistance, United Nations Development Program
Dirk Steffes-enn, First Secretary, Development Cooperation, Germany Embassy
Shanker Pandey, Local Representative and Head of Office, KfW Development Bank
Ilryoung Lee, Deputy Representative, Korean International Cooperation Agency
Shristi Chitrakar, Assistant Officer, Korean International Cooperation Agency
Jitendra Bohara, Program Coordinator, International Office on Migration
Ariani Soejoeti, Public Relations Officer, International Office on Migration
Ram Prasad Bhandari, Assistance Program Manager – Aid Coordination, Disaster Management, Private Sector, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Ram Krishna Dahal, Finance Associate, UNFPA
Shyam Thapa, Program Associate, UNFPA
Sarina KC, Communications/ AMP Focal Point, UNICEF
Ashok Vaidya, Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist, UNICEF
Kamakshi Rai Yakthumba, Program Manager, Cross Program, DFAT
Uttam Das Shresthra, Chief Accountant, DANIDA

Andreas Roettger, Head of Cooperation, European Union
Mario Lontro, Program Officer, European Union
Nama R. Budhathoki, Executive Director, Kathmandu Living Labs
Bibhusa Bista, Young Innovations
Joshua Leslie, Development Initiatives

In addition to formal interviews, this research was informed by informal discussion with participants in the Aid Management Platform Workshop, 10-12 December 2014, Kathmandu, Nepal. These participants included individuals from Development Gateway and numerous country delegations, including:

Kastriot Halili, Kosovo Delegation
Florim Canolli, Kosovo Delegation
Mahamat Mamadou Addy, Chad Delegation
Abdel-Hosky Nassour, Chad Delegation
Bihindi Khatib, Tanzania Delegation
Oman Mkima, Tanzania Delegation
Thani Kassim, Tanzania Delegation
Mussa Anwar, Malawi Delegation
Moses Chiwoni, Malawi Delegation
Ferdinand Tumwebaze, Uganda Delegation
Collins Ishimwe, Uganda Delegation
Azizah Nabitalo, Uganda Delegation
James Herrera, Timor-Leste Delegation
Soares Gaudencio, Timor-Leste Delegation
Elson Martinho da Costa, Timor-Leste Delegation
Seydou Yayé, Niger Delegation
Moustapha Issa Mountari, Niger Delegation
Alica Viviana Dodo, Côte d'Ivoire Delegation
Kouakou Mida Théophile Koffy, Côte d'Ivoire Delegation
Bandama Jean March Koffi, Côte d'Ivoire Delegation
Suman Prasad Sharma, Nepal Delegation
Tilakman Bhandari, Nepal Delegation
Karki Bhuban, Nepal Delegation
Marasini Madhu, Nepal Delegation
Gairhe Thakur, Nepal Delegation
Khatri LB, Nepal Delegation
Mohan Sigh Basnet, Nepal Delegation
Chandika Dhakal, Nepal Delegation
Asor Henry Nkang, Nigeria Delegation
Rekiya Ibrahima Atta, Nigeria Delegation
Indra Sharan, USAID Nepal
Kristina Kempkey, USAID (Washington, DC)
Brian Bingham, USAID (Washington, DC)
Bubhusan Bista, Young Innovations/Open Nepal

Wendy Rogers, Development Initiatives
Jean-Louis Sarbib, Development Gateway
Taryn Davis, Development Gateway
Fabrice Musoni, Development Gateway
Denise Butcher, Development Gateway
Vanessa Goas, Development Gateway
Dustin Homer, Development Gateway
Josh Powell, Development Gateway
Dina Abdel-Fattah, Development Gateway
Dan Runfola, AidData
Ashley Napier, AidData
Kate Weaver, University of Texas
Shelby Carvalho, University of Texas
Zehra Akbar, University of Texas
Brian O'Donnell, University of Texas

Remote Correspondence (email & skype)

Tim Davies, World Web Foundation
Didier Trinh, Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network
Alena Stern, AidData
Lauren Harrison, AidData
Marc Maxson, Global Giving Innovation Partner
Danila Boneva, UNDP/IATI
Martin Tinse, Omidyar Network
Patrick Meier, Ushahidi
Tony German, Development Initiatives

Brussels, Belgium

ONE Campaign
EU

Others (remote correspondence/meetings at international conferences)

Global Leadership Fellow, Princeton University
KfW/BMZ (Bonn, Germany)

Online Appendix II (to be posted online/not included in word count)

Table A1: Agencies in the ATI

Organization	Country	Covered by ATI						Aid Agency
		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Australian Agency for International Development	Australia	•	•	•				Yes
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Australia				•		•	No
Austrian Development Agency	Austria	•	•	•	•			Yes
Belgian Development Agency	Belgium	•	•					Yes
Directorate General for Cooperation and Development	Belgium			•	•	•	•	Yes
Brazilian Cooperation Agency	Brazil		•	•	•			Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Bulgaria	•	•	•	•			No
Canadian International Development Agency	Canada	•	•	•				Yes
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development	Canada				•		•	No
Ministry of Commerce	China	•	•	•	•		•	No
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs	Croatia				•			No
CyprusAid	Cyprus			•	•			Yes
Planning Bureau	Cyprus	•	•					No
Czech Development Agency	Czech	•	•	•	•			Yes
Danida	Denmark	•	•					Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Denmark			•	•	•	•	No
DG Development and Cooperation	EC	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission	EC	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
DG Enlargement	EC	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Foreign Policy Instruments Service	EC		•	•	•	•		No

Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Estonia	•	•	•	•			No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Finland	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
French Agency for Development	France	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	France		•	•	•		•	No
Ministry of Economy and Finance	France		•	•	•		•	No
Foreign Office	Germany			•	•			No
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)-GIZ	Germany	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)-KfW	Germany	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
HellenicAid	Greece	•	•	•	•			Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Hungary	•	•	•	•			No
Irish Aid	Ireland	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Italy	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Japan International Cooperation Agency	Japan	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Japan		•	•	•		•	No
Economic Cooperation Development Fund	Korea	•	•					Yes
Korean International Cooperation Agency	Korea	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Latvia	•	•	•	•			No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Lithuania	•	•	•	•			No
Lux-Development	Luxembourg	•	•					Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Luxembourg			•	•			No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Malta	•	•	•	•			No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Netherlands	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
New Zealand Aid Programme -	New Zealand	•	•	•	•			No
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation - Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Norway	•	•	•	•		•	No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Poland	•	•	•	•			No

Portuguese Camões – Instituto da Cooperação da Língua	Portugal		•	•	•			No
Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance	Portugal	•						Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Romania	•	•	•	•			No
Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation	Slovakia	•	•	•	•			Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Slovenia	•	•	•	•			No
Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation -	Spain	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	Sweden	•	•	•				Yes
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Sweden				•	•	•	No
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation	Switzerland	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Department of finance	UAE						•	No
Department of Defense	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Millennium Challenge Corporation	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
Department of State	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Department of the Treasury	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
United States Agency for International Development	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
CDC Group	UK	•	•					Yes
Department of Energy and Climate Change	UK		•					No
Department for International Development	UK	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
Foreign and Commonwealth Office	UK		•	•	•			No
Ministry of Defence	UK		•	•	•			No
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	UN		•	•	•		•	Yes

United Nations Development Programme	UN	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
United Nations Children's Fund	UN		•	•	•		•	Yes
International Development Association - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	WB	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
International Finance Corporation	WB	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Adaptation Fund			•					Yes
African Development Bank		•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Asian Development Bank		•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Clean Technology Fund			•					Yes
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
European Investment Bank		•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation			•	•	•		•	Yes
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization		•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Global Environment Facility			•					Yes
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria		•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Inter-American Development Bank		•	•	•	•		•	Yes
International Monetary Fund				•	•		•	No
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation		•	•					Yes

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